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  504-506; Borza 1990, pp. 207-208; Hammond 1994, pp. 30, 120-122; Carney

  1987, p. 41; Carney 2000, pp. 62-64; Carney 2006, pp. 12-16; Corvisier 2002, pp.

  91-93.

  22

  Chapter I

  climax of which was the siege of Olynthus. Athenian indecision,

  procrastination and finally inadequate help sealed the fate of the city,

  which was stormed and destroyed by Philip in 348. The conquest of

  Thrace and Chalcidice allowed Philip to grant generous allotments of land

  to his hetairoi and other veterans, which increased the number of

  Macedonia’s potential army recruits, and among the beneficiaries ensured

  feelings of gratitude to the king. Philip’s and Alexander’s commitment to

  founding settlements in freshly conquered land is attested in 4th-century

  inscriptions from that area.48

  The primary reason Philip II of Macedonia got involved in Greece’s

  internal politics was the Third Sacred War, which like all the sacred wars

  was fought in defence of the Delphic Shrine of Apollo, to whom Philip

  showed particular reverence since the start of his reign. The war’s

  outbreak may be seen as an outcome of the political chaos in Greece

  towards the end of the first half of the 4th century, when after the death of

  the great Theban general Epaminondas at the Battle of Mantinea in 362

  none of the contemporary major powers were strong enough to impose full

  hegemony. Many Greek states also experienced internal strife ( stasis), in

  which foreign powers got involved. This is what affected the tiny polis of

  Delphi. In 363 a group of supporters of neighbouring Phocis were expelled

  from Delphi on the instigation of Thebes and her allies in the

  Amphictionic Council, which was in charge of Apollo’s sanctuary. In 357

  the Amphictionic Council passed a motion (probably raised by Delphi and

  supported by Thebes and her allies) imposing a heavy fine of 500 talents

  on the Phocians, who were charged with farming land belonging to

  Apollo, i.e. the Delphic sanctuary. The Phocians did not pay the fine, for

  which they were condemned at the next gathering of the Amphictionic

  Council in 356. It was then that the Phocian political leaders Philomelus

  and Onomarchus, having secured the backing of Sparta, which had also

  been burdened with an equally heavy fine for crimes perpetrated against

  Thebes, managed to persuade the Phocian League to invade Delphi and

  take over her treasures and the sanctuary. Indeed, that was what happened,

  as a consequence of which Philomelus’s troops also massacred Locrian

  soldiers who had come to defend Delphi. This lawlessness was accepted

  by Athens and Sparta, which by de facto supporting the Phocians wanted

  to punish Thebes and use the fact the latter would be preoccupied with the

  48 Momigliano 1975, p. 132; Kienast 1994, pp. 24-27; Borza 1990, pp. 212-216;

  Hammond 1994, pp. 31-40; Spawforth 2007, p. 92. Inscriptions: Syll.3 332, SEG

  36.626, 40.542; see Errington 1998.

  Childhood, Family, Macedonia

  23

  Delphic conflict to achieve their own political objectives. In October 356

  the Amphictionic Council declared war on the Phocians.49

  A relatively weak Phocian militia was augmented with mercenaries

  hired for money that had been stolen from the Delphic sanctuary. Taking

  the Amphityonic Council’s side in this armed conflict were the Boeotian

  League, Thessaly and other smaller states which wished to punish the

  sacrilegious plunderers. In 355, chiefly supported by Thessaly, Thebes

  defeated the Phocians at the Battle of Neon. Erroneously considering this

  victory the end of the conflict, Thebes, for Persian money, now sent her

  best commander Pammenes and 5,000 hoplites to Asia Minor. Meanwhile

  the new Phocian leader Onomarchus raised a new mercenary army and

  restarted the war. Philip’s aforementioned victory over the Phocians at the

  Battle of the Crocus Field in 352 gave him control of Thessaly, but it, too,

  did not end the Sacred War, for there were other Greek states on the

  Phocian side. Among them was Athens, where Demosthenes, the leader of

  an anti-Macedonian party and one of the greatest orators of Antiquity, was

  now rising to prominence. However, Philip’s subsequent victories in

  Thrace and on the Chalcidice Peninsula forced Athens to finally try and

  secure a status quo through the Peace of Philocrates (thus named after the

  head of the Athenian delegation to the King of Macedonia) in 346. Soon

  afterwards Philip ended the Sacred War by occupying Phocis without a

  battle and accepting the capitulation of the Phocian army from their leader

  Phalaikos. The Amphityonic Council ordered the Phocians to disarm and

  remain disarmed until they had repaid the last instalment of their

  reparations for the plunder of Delphi. Philip, on the other hand, was

  rewarded for his services by being granted the Phocians’ seat at the

  council. On top of that he was awarded the privilege of having precedence

  in consulting the oracle ( promanteia). This prestigious right had

  previously belonged to the Athenians, who were now also being punished

  for their sacrilege. These were the rewards for thirteen years of building up

  Macedonia’s strength which ratified Macedonia’s position of a fully

  fledged Greek power. A tangible sign of Philip’s new status was the

  emission of gold coins, which historians first date immediately after the

  Peace of Philocrates.50

  49 Buckler 1989, pp. 5, 9-29.

  50 Cawkwell 1978, pp. 62-68, 77-113; Montgomery 1985, pp. 42-44; Buckler

  1989, pp. 30-142; Hammond 1994, pp. 45-49, 90-108; Corvisier 2002, pp. 222-

  236.

  24

  Chapter I

  5. Philip II and Alexander’s Macedonian army

  The dominance Philip II gained over Greece and much of the Balkan

  Peninsula followed by Alexander’s conquest of the Persian Empire would

  not have been possible without a powerful army. Philip built his army

  virtually ex nihilo and continued building it throughout his reign. The

  number of Macedonian soldiers Philip deployed in the 358 pitched battle

  against the Illyrians included 10,000 infantry and 600 cavalry,51 which,

  considering the battle’s significance, must have represented the

  Macedonian state’s full military might. When 24 years later Alexander led

  12,000 phalangites and 3,500 cavalry into Asia, he left another 12,000

  infantry and 1,500 cavalry in Europe. Such a massive rise in numbers over

  a time of just one generation was only possible thanks to territorial

  expansion and therefore also a population expansion allowing for a larger

  number of army recruits. On the other hand, the Macedonian army’s

  expansion also reflected Philip II’s revenues, for all these soldiers, be they

  Macedonians or mercenaries, had to be paid.

  The basic type of military formation in Philip II’s army was the

  Macedonian phalanx, which differed quite considerably from the similarly

  named Greek phalanx. Diodorus describes how this infantry was formed

  as follows: ‘Having strengthened the army units and properly equipped the

  soldiers, he constantly organised armed exercises. He also invented a form
/>   of tight formation and the equipment for his phalanx.’52 Attempts have

  been made to interpret this passing comment as referring to the fact that

  Philip had his soldiers arm themselves in accordance with his own

  stipulations from their own private funds.53 This, however, is an over

  interpretation of Diodorus’ text, in which he clearly states that Philip

  provided the equipment for his men. In all probability in 359 Philip II

  made a breakthrough in military history by deciding that his troops would

  be supplied with arms at the state’s expense. This was of course a huge

  burden for the royal treasury, but – as later events in his reign showed – it

  was one the state was able to bear. This was so especially when we

  consider that a thus equipped army resulted in future victories, which in

  turn gave the monarch additional revenues in the form of loot, tributes,

  slaves (who were always an easily sellable commodity), taxes and various

  other assets that could be gained from conquest. In this way Philip was

  able to create a fully armed infantry out of all sorts of recruits, be they

  even serfs or people simply not rich enough to buy their own hoplite

  51 Diod., 16.4.3.

  52 Diod., 16.3.1-2 after Philip’s contemporary Ephorus; see Hammond 1994, p. 25.

  53 Griffith 1979, pp. 420-421.

  Childhood, Family, Macedonia

  25

  panoplia.54 The fact that the king was able to provide armour for each

  infantryman meant that the creation of an army was limited only by the

  availability of men in the recruiting age, which in populous Macedonia

  could be tens of thousands of recruits. By contrast, in a typical polis the

  figure would not even be in thousands but more often than not in

  hundreds, for the number of adult males usually ranged between 230 and

  1250.55

  The most basic and famous element of the Macedonian phalangite’s

  weaponry, one which distinguished them from the soldiers of other

  contemporary formations, was a spear or pike called the sarissa.56 Though

  no complete sarissa has survived to this day, accounts from ancient

  sources, iconographic images and quite numerous metal remnants of

  various types of sarissai have provided considerable information about

  this spear. We know that the shaft was made of very hard and elastic

  cornel-wood ( cornus mas), which grew in abundance in Macedonia. The

  philosopher Theophrastus, who was a contemporary of Philip II and

  Alexander and knew Macedonia well, states that the longest sarissai of

  that period measured 12 cubits. Unfortunately it is difficult to determine its

  precise length in modern measurements as a cubit (the length of a forearm)

  could vary between 44 and 52.5 cm. Most historians estimate that the

  sarissa in Philip II and Alexander’s day measured between 4.5 and 5.5 m.

  According to Polybius, the spear’s length was extended in the Hellenistic

  period to approximately 16 cubits (over 6 m), which increased its range

  but diminished the Macedonian phalanx’s manoeuvrability.57 The infantry

  used three quite different types of sarissa. The lightest version weighed

  approximately 3 kg. It was also one of the two shorter versions, measuring

  4.5 m, and had a relatively light iron spearhead. The other shorter version

  was of the same length, but as well as having a longer spearhead and

  ferrule (together measuring c. 0.5 m) it also had a metal spike at the base.

  Thus it weighed approximately 5.35 kg. The longer version of sarissa

  measured 5.5 m and its wooden shaft was considerably thicker than in the

  shorter types so as to reduce its vibrations when in use. The spearhead was

  with a ferrule and – as in the other shorter version – the butt end also had a

  metal spike. On account of its additional length and thickness it weighed c.

  6.2 kg. These measurements have been arrived at on the basis of excavated

  metal parts of the sarissa and reconstructions of the spear made by

  54 Errington 1990, pp. 238-239; Billows 1994, pp. 13-14.

  55 Ruschenbusch 1985.

  56 On sarissa mostly after Markle 1982.

  57 Thphr., HP, 3.12.2; Plb., 18.29.2. Griffith 1979, p. 421; Mixter 1992; Noguera

  Borel 1999.

  26

  Chapter I

  archaeologists. There were several reasons why the sarissa was weighted

  down by a metal spike at the base. Firstly, it counterweighted the

  spearhead and ferrule, thanks to which the phalangite could grasp the spear

  further back with 2/3 or even 4/5 of the spear in front of him. Thus the

  range of phalangite sarissai was considerably greater than that of the

  spears of their opponents. The metal spikes could also be fixed in the

  ground when the sarissai were used against cavalry attacks. Finally, if a

  sarissa was broken in battle, a phalangite could continue fighting with the

  rest of the shaft by using the spear’s pointed butt as a replacement

  spearhead.

  The phalangite’s weaponry was supplemented with a sword or dagger.

  Macedonian swords excavated at Vergine are about 55 cm long and their

  shape indicates that they were used for both cutting and thrusting. In battle

  the sword was a reserve weapon to be resorted to once the sarissai were

  broken and of no further use. The sword was also used when the phalanx

  formation was broken as the sarissa, unlike hoplite spears, was not

  suitable for man-to-man fighting. Swords were also naturally used when

  storming city walls in situations where sarissai were totally ineffective.58

  Archaeologists examining an ancient cemetery at Vergine have

  uncovered the graves of ordinary Macedonian soldiers who had most

  probably served in the phalanx and were buried with elements of their

  fighting gear. One of the reasons why these finds are so significant is the

  fact that they date from immediately after the reign of Alexander the Great

  and therefore provide us with an insight into how soldiers of that time

  were equipped, many of whom would have served under Alexander’s

  command. The graves contain the spearheads of both sarissai and hoplite

  spears, though the latter actually outnumber the former by approximately

  three to one. No doubt to a certain extent this reflects proportions in which

  both types of weapon were used in Alexander’s army. The phalangites

  would have been trained to use both the sarissa and the hoplite type of

  spear, just as they would have been taught to use the sword and no doubt

  also the javelin. All sorts of weapon were used depending on the situation

  and the sarissa was in all probability reserved for pitched battles. The lack

  of spearheads of an indisputable sarissa type to be found during the

  excavation of Olynthus has even led some scholars to believe that

  originally Philip’s phalanx was armed with ordinary hoplite spears and

  that the sarissa was introduced only towards the end of his reign.59

  58 Markle 1982, pp. 101-102.

  59 Markle 1978; Markle 1982, pp. 98-99.

  Childhood, Family, Macedonia

  27

  No source actually states that Macedonian phalangites did not wear

  abdominal armour, but, on the other hand, nor is such armour mentioned

  in any of the major sources. It is not
mentioned either in the inventory of

  the Macedonian soldier’s gear inscribed at Amphipolis during the reign of

  Philip V or in Polyaenus’ description of how Philip II trained his phalanx:

  ‘Philip used to train the Macedonians before battles, making them take

  their arms and march for 300 stades [54 km] carrying their helmets,

  shields, greaves, sarissas, plus – in addition to their arms – a stock of

  provisions and all the utensils necessary for daily life.’ It is difficult to

  treat the exclusion of such an important item as body armour from both

  lists as a mere coincidence and it is therefore fair to assume that in all

  probability, with the exception of officers, most 4th- and early 3rd-centrury

  phalangites did not wear metal body armour. Some of them at least,

  however, are very likely to have worn non metal armour, e.g. linen or

  leather corselets.60 Various explanations are given by military historians

  for this. Some are of the opinion that this was Philip’s decision reflecting

  new trends in Greek armies. Certain sources suggest that after the

  Peloponnesian War there was a discernable trend in reducing the amount

  of protective armour worn by hoplites, some of whom went into battle in

  leather jerkins instead of the heavy and expensive bronze armour. This

  could have been a result of hoplites imitating the highly effective peltast

  mercenaries, who did not wear armour. It could also simply mean that

  people were now being recruited to serve in the phalanx who could not

  afford a full set of armour. Another possible reason could have been the

  sheer advantage of dispensing with armour that weighed from over a

  dozen to 20 kg during long marches. Thus alleviated soldiers had a far

  greater ability to surprise the enemy and perform much more flexibly in

  the battlefield, for such phalanx could carry out the more complex

  manoeuvres; ones for which the armies of Philip and Alexander were

  famous. Finally, armour was superfluous when arrows and javelins raining

  down on the Macedonian phalanx could be deflected by a dense forest of