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  Somatophylakes (‘personal bodyguards’). Despite their name, the latter

  were not only to physically protect their king but also serve as officers

  carefully selected from the king’s most trusted men to carry out special

  missions. The king, who wore no unique garments or head covering

  distinguishing him from his wellborn subjects, was probably addressed by

  name. Indeed, the ancient authors draw our attention to the fact that there

  was generally little social distance between Macedonian kings and their

  subjects, who in the Classical and Hellenistic periods still had easy access

  to their monarch and relative freedom to speak out ( parrhesia) in his

  presence. The abilities of riding a horse, using weapons and hunting were

  an essential part of every young Macedonian aristocrat’s education. The

  hunting down of the first wild boar and the killing of the first enemy in

  battle were elements of the Macedonian ‘rites of passage’. It was only then

  that a young aristocrat was entitled to wear a belt and feast, as was the

  fashion in the ancient world, in a half reclined position. The Greeks were

  shocked by a peculiar form of pederasty practiced by Philip II’s hetairoi in

  which the adult could be the passive partner in a homosexual

  relationship.23 Macedonian aristocrats loved breeding horses which

  originated from the famous Median Nesaian breed brought over to

  Macedonia during the Persian rule.24

  Little is known about Macedonia’s lower social orders before the

  Hellenistic period as they were not an object of interest to ancient authors.

  The usual custom in the Balkan states was for the aristocracy to rule over a

  serf majority, who in Thessaly were called the penestai. And such was no

  23 Theopomp., FGrH, 115 F225. Flower 1994, pp. 109-119.

  24 Errington 1990, pp. 152-154, 219-220; Billows 1990, pp. 19-22; Borza 1990, pp.

  85-88; Badian 1996, pp. 11-12; Heckel 2003, pp. 206-208.

  Childhood, Family, Macedonia

  11

  doubt also the social structure in aristocratically dominated Macedonia.25

  This social structure probably determined the composition of the

  Macedonian army, whose only valuable element was the aristocratic

  cavalry. This would have been so on account of the fact that in most

  ancient states the army was composed of citizens or subjects who were

  obliged to equip themselves for war at their own cost. Therefore lacking

  their own adequately protective (and expensive) armour, proper training

  and no doubt motivation, serfs were a lightly armed infantry of virtually

  no military value, especially when pitched against the phalanx: the basic

  Greek formation of classical times which had for centuries dominated

  battlefields in the Mediterranean zone. The phalanx was also a product of

  the given social structure and mentality of the polis, inhabited as it was by

  a predominantly free and relatively well-off peasantry. The polis citizen

  would acquire his own hoplite equipment, which included a breastplate,

  helmet, greaves, a large circular shield, a spear and a sword. It is estimated

  that in all such equipment would have cost approximately 300 drachmas,

  which was more or less as much as a hired worker could earn in a year.

  This meant that genuinely poor landless people who had to support

  themselves by working for others could not become hoplites. On the other

  hand, hoplite armour was considerably cheaper than the purchase of a

  warhorse, which could cost from 500 to 6,000 drachmas. Moreover the

  feeding and care of such a horse could be compared to the annual

  expenditure of a family of six. The fact that riders were expected to cover

  all these costs meant that only the very richest could afford to serve in the

  cavalry, which traditionally remained the preserve of aristocracy.26

  Therefore the predominance in Greek armies of hoplites, i.e. middle-class

  soldiers, reflects the egalitarian and democratic aspect of the polis.

  Apart from being relatively well trained, the hoplites were noted for

  their courage, determination, ability to maintain discipline on the

  battlefield and solidarity among brothers in arms. These were

  characteristics associated with the civic nature of the polis, where the

  decision to wage war was decided at public gatherings by the votes of

  citizens after open and free debates. The amateur composition of the

  citizens’ army determined its preferred military tactic which was to try to

  resolve a war with one rapid hoplite attack. The phalanx was usually eight

  ranks deep and would advance on the enemy by breaking into a run in an

  attempt to break his lines with a massed full frontal assault, i.e. without

  any complicated manoeuvres or use of tactical reserves. The only

  25 Billows 1994, pp. 9-10.

  26 Figures after Hanson 1999, especially pp. 104-105, 226-227.

  12

  Chapter I

  contemporary formation capable of withstanding such an attack was

  another phalanx. Greek city-state armies were, however, reluctant to fight

  protracted wars far from their polis. Such was the prestige of the phalanx

  as the most important formation in the Greek army that for a long time

  some of the wealthier citizens chose to serve in the heavily armed infantry

  rather than the traditional preserve of the aristocracy, the cavalry. This

  exceptional prestige stemmed not only from the fact that the infantry

  decided the outcomes of battles and therefore also the fate of the city-state,

  but also because being a hoplite required particular courage and physical

  prowess. What is more, in some states, such as Sparta, weaker men served

  in the cavalry, whereas the phalanx was reserved for the very best

  warriors. This image of Greek city-state armies started to change in the 4th

  century when the cavalry regained importance and highly trained

  mercenary light infantry ( peltastai) units were introduced. Nevertheless,

  up to the Battle of Chaeronea or even later faith in the citizen hoplite

  army’s ability to deliver the decisive blow was upheld in Greek military

  doctrine.27

  Ancient sources provide no convincing evidence of the permanent

  existence of a fully battle worthy infantry in the Macedonian army before

  the reign of Philip II and Diodorus actually claims that Philip was the

  creator of the Macedonian phalanx.28 Some historians even claim that on

  account of the social conditions the creation of such a hoplite infantry

  would have been impossible. Contemporary states lacking appropriate

  social or cultural conditions to have their own citizens’ hoplite army

  usually hired mercenaries. Such a course of action was taken up by the

  Great King and satraps of the western provinces of Persia, the rulers of

  Egypt as well as the tyrants of Thessaly, though in the last of these

  countries attempts to form its own heavy infantry had been made since at

  least the 6th century. The primitive level of agriculture combined with the

  aristocratic character of the state meant that Macedonian kings lacked the

  financial resources to hire very well trained but expensive Greek

  mercenaries. Before the reign of Philip II Macedonia’s army was usually

  limited to the aris
tocratic cavalry and primitive light infantry, both of

  which stood little chance against the Greek phalanx on the battlefield. That

  is why throughout most of the Classical period Macedonian was a

  militarily weak state on whose territories the armies of stronger Greek

  states frequently intervened.29 This situation changed radically under

  27 Hanson 1999, pp. 84-141; van Wees 2000, pp. 87-88; Lendon 2005, pp. 102-

  105.

  28 Diod., 16.3.1-3.

  29 Greenwalt 1999, p. 171; Archibald 2000, p. 230.

  Childhood, Family, Macedonia

  13

  Philip II and his reorganisation of the Macedonian army will be discussed

  later in this chapter.

  3. The Argead Dynasty

  Macedonian tradition, preserved by Herodotus and Thucydides, speaks of

  wanderings of the ancestors of the Macedonians, their conquest of Pieria

  and other lands in Lower Macedonia as well as of the expulsion or

  subjugation of the original inhabitants. Modern research has confirmed

  that such events indeed took place around 650. It was then that the

  Makedones conquered Lower Macedonia or at least the part of it in the

  vicinity of Aegae, which today is associated with the archaeological

  remains near the village of Vergina. Aegae became a Macedonian bastion

  and the first capital of the Macedonian state, if at this early stage one can

  use such a term.30 Other Macedonian tribes occupied the lands of the

  Elimeia and Lyncestis in Upper Macedonia. In all probability while these

  tribes were still moving the Makedon warriors were led by the Argeads,

  the first Macedonian royal dynasty. It was under their leadership that over

  the last 100 or 150 years the tribes went on to conquer the whole of Lower

  Macedonia.

  According to Herodotus, the Macedonian dynasty was descended from

  Temenos of the Heraclids, the refugee from Argos. Scholars who accept

  this version call it the Temenid dynasty and explain the relative stability of

  their position in Macedonia as a result of their external origins.31 However,

  Herodotus’s version is not confirmed by other ancient sources, whereas

  the key elements – origins traced back to the Greek heroes, especially

  Heracles – are a bit too typical of the genealogical tales deliberately made

  up for Greek or Hellenised aristocrats to be believed. Presumably it was

  invented no earlier than after the Persian wars at the court of Alexander I,

  which was then trying to use Hellenophile propaganda to sway Greek

  public opinion and improve relations with Athens. Philip II and Alexander

  III, on the other hand, had specific political motives to stress their

  genealogical affinity with Heracles in particular.32

  Alexander I was the actual founder of the Macedonian state and

  historically its first ruler. As a very talented political player he was

  consummately able to exploit not only the Persian occupation of Thrace

  30 Hdt., 8.136-138; Th., 2.99. Borza 1990, pp. 84-85.

  31 Hdt., 8.137-139. Hammond 1979, pp. 3-14, 152.

  32 Badian 1982, pp. 34-36; Borza 1982, pp. 7-13; Huttner 1997, pp. 65-85; Hall

  2000, p. 64.

  14

  Chapter I

  and Macedonia but also their subsequent defeats at Salamis (480) and

  Plataea (479) by the league of Greek states. During the time of Persian

  dominance Alexander I was a loyal vassal of Darius I and Xerxes I. He

  gave away his sister Gygaia to the Persian aristocrat Bubares and adopted

  the Persian system of administration as well as elements of Persian culture.

  Thanks to his ties with Persia, Alexander I consolidated his control over

  Lower Macedonia and subjugated the mini states of Upper Macedonia.33

  But at the same time he also maintained contact with Athens, selling her

  Macedonian timber to build a fleet. Although tales of the Macedonian king

  helping the Greeks during the 480-479 wars with Persia, particularly just

  before the Battle of Plataea, are most probably apocryphal, Alexander’s

  loyalty to the Persian suzerain certainly did not survive Xerxes’ European

  defeat. Alexander I’s adroitness in liaising with both the Persian invader

  and the ultimately victorious Greeks, particularly Athens, enabled a

  peripheral and backward Macedonia to become for a short while a regional

  power in its part of the Balkans.34

  The next attempt to build a strong Macedonian state was undertaken by

  Archelaus (413-399). He was an ally of Athens in the final phase of the

  Peloponnesian War and tried to reform his weak and peripheral state by

  building roads and fortresses. It was presumably his decision make Pella

  Macedonia’s capital because, according to Xenophon, in 382 it was the

  most important city in the land and it is hard to imagine that the shifting of

  the capital would have occurred in the years of chaos that followed

  Archelaus’s death.35

  Besides, the reasons for the move could only have been economic as in

  military terms Pella was in a more vulnerable position than the old capital

  at Aegae. Indeed, thanks to the river Ludias, Pella had access to the sea,

  which allowed the king of Macedon to make additional profits from the

  export of timber and other forest products (pitch and resin) as well as other

  natural resources. Political stability as well as the external security

  provided by Archelaus’ reign allowed Macedonia to become prosperous,

  as is testified by the high quality of its silver in two-drachm coins that

  were issued in that period. Thucydides also attributes Archelaus with

  arming his soldiers with the ‘ hoplon’, which for a long time was

  interpreted as evidence that he had created a heavy (hoplite) infantry.

  Currently a more sceptical opinion prevails which notes the lack of any

  33 Fol, Hammond 1988, p. 249; Borza 1990, pp.100-105; Brosius 2003a, pp. 230-

  231.

  34 Borza 1990, pp. 113-115, 123-131.

  35 X., HG, 5.2.13. Hammond 1979, pp. 139-140; Borza 1990, pp. 166-171;

  Greenwalt 1999, pp. 163-164.

  Childhood, Family, Macedonia

  15

  trace in the sources that such weapons were used by Macedonians at the

  time as well as the fact that the ancient authors suggest Macedonia’s

  military weakness at the start of the 4th century. However, we know that

  Archelaus conducted an aggressive foreign policy and towards the end of

  his reign he ordered military intervention in Thessaly on the side of the

  Aleuad aristocratic family. It was thanks to this intervention that

  Macedonia gained the borderland region of Perrhaebia, which provided it

  with an important link to Greece. Moreover, a Macedonian garrison was

  briefly installed in Thessaly’s chief city – Larissa. However, Archelaus’

  successes were short-lived as Macedonian troops had to withdraw from

  Thessaly as Spartan forces, then imposing hegemony over the whole of

  Greece after the Peloponnesian War, moved in. Nonetheless the

  Thessalian expedition is noteworthy in that it showed the direction of

  Macedonian expansion which became so important in the times of Philip

  II and Alexander. Even if Archelaus had actually formed some hoplite

  units, they would have in all certainty been disbanded in the years of chaos


  that followed his death.36 This monarch had promoted the Hellenisation of

  the Macedonian elites by organising theatre festivals in Dion and inviting

  to his court numerous Greek artists, including Zeuxis, Agathon, Timotheos

  and Euripides, who reportedly was torn apart by a pack of dogs in Pella.37

  It was this policy of Hellenisation that would prove to be his lasting

  legacy.38

  Archelaus’ other achievements, administrative ones, came to nothing in

  the anarchic early decades of the 4th century, when the Argead dynasty

  was blighted by assassinations and political coups. Mini states broke away

  from Argead control in Upper Macedonia and the whole country was

  subjected to repeated invasions and looting by neighbouring nations,

  particularly the Illyrians. At the time of the Theban hegemony over Greece

  Macedonia became de facto a Boeotian fief. As a guarantee of his loyalty,

  King Alexander II had to give to the Thebans hostages, including his own

  brother Philip, who spent three years in Thebes and returned to Macedonia

  in 364. Shortly afterwards war broke out between Macedonia and the

  Illyria, which was then rising in power and whose king, Bardylis, defeated

  in battle Philip’s brother, King Perdiccas III, killing him and some 4000 of

  36 Th., 2.100.2; Polyaen., 2.1.17; X., HG, 5.2.40. Milns 1976, pp. 92-93; Markle

  1978, p. 485; Cawkwell 1978, p. 31; Borza 1990, pp. 165-166; Snodgrass 1999, p.

  116.

  37 Satyr., Vit. Eur. , fr. 39.21; St.Byz., s.v. Borm∂skoj. Schorn 2004, pp. 310-311,

  340.

  38 Borza 1990, pp. 161-177.

  16

  Chapter I

  his troops.39 Most history books state that the battle took place in 359,

  though some historians believe that it happened somewhat earlier in 360.40

  4. Philip II and the rebuilding of the Macedonian state

  Born in 383 or 382, as the third son of King Amyntas III and Princess

  Eurydice probably originally from the Upper Macedonian kingdom of

  Lyncestis, Philip was a long way down the line of succession to the throne.

  For this reason he was probably not regarded to be a particularly important